The UAE: The Middle East's Gaza Envelope
Also, a new appointment sheds light on Judaization plans in Israel's periphery.
IAF fighter squadron flying over Jerusalem yesterday.
It’s Tuesday, May 5, and yesterday, shortly after news broke that the UAE was attacked by Iran, Jerusalem shook with a massive sonic boom as a squadron of Israeli Air Force fighter jets tore overhead. Naturally, the exact same thought popped into every head in the city at once: “Looks like the war is back on.” After 20 minutes of mentally inventorying the supplies needed for a return to the bomb shelters, the IAF finally issued a clarification. This wasn’t a combat sortie heading east; it was just a rehearsal for the farewell flyover honoring outgoing IAF Chief Tomer Bar. Apparently, the IAF takes going out with a bang quite literally.
But the Jerusalemites’ fear of regional escalation is well-founded, especially after yesterday’s events. As part of “Operation Freedom,” U.S. destroyers successfully guided commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz—sinking six Iranian fast-attack craft that attempted to interfere in the process.
This left the regime in an incredibly awkward position: its threats of a blockade had just been exposed as empty. Unable to pierce the defenses of the U.S. convoy, Iran immediately pivoted to softer targets. They struck the UAE’s oil infrastructure in Fujairah, a South Korean cargo vessel, and impacted Oman.
So, is the war back on? Not exactly.
President Donald Trump indicated that these most recent Iranian attacks did not constitute a ceasefire violation, stating there was no “heavy firing” involved. Welcome to the “Israel Club,” UAE—sometimes your immediate security needs are subordinated to a larger U.S. strategic goal.
The larger goal here isn’t the collapse of the Iranian regime; it’s the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. While Operation Freedom was ostensibly a humanitarian mission to extract trapped ships, it was also a test of a classic naval strategy: the convoy escort. The mission proved to both Trump and the Iranians that if the U.S. wants to, it can forcefully reopen the strait by escorting international shipping.
It’s a powerful strategy that becomes even more potent under a continuing ceasefire. It transforms what was previously a two-way street of passive economic pressure into a one-way street aimed directly at Iran. Any economic ticking clock that might have been pressuring Trump to withdraw freezes, while the clock measuring the lifespan of the regime just keeps ticking.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during an interview in Tehran, 2025. (Presidential Website)
Meanwhile, the internal fractures in Tehran are showing. President Masoud Pezeshkian reportedly expressed intense anger at the IRGC, describing its missile and drone strikes on the UAE as “completely irresponsible” and executed without the government’s knowledge. Pezeshkian is said to have called the IRGC’s approach to regional escalation “madness,” warning of potentially irreversible consequences.
Pezeshkian may not be in control of the country anymore—if he ever truly was—but he is underestimating the logic of the IRGC. If the reality of a U.S.-enforced open strait takes hold, the hardliners in Tehran may calculate that triggering an open war (which might ultimately force Trump to withdraw) is a better bet than a guaranteed, slow economic strangulation.
The ultimate victim of these events is the UAE. Not only was it the most heavily targeted country during Operation Roaring Lion, but it has now been firmly installed on the lowest rung of the escalation ladder. Tehran is hesitant to poke the Israeli bear—which is currently barely being held back from mauling the regime by Trump—so instead, it lobs a few munitions at its neighbor across the gulf.
This strategy works for Tehran for a few key reasons. First, despite briefly attacking Iran during the war, the UAE is highly unlikely to escalate or go it alone. Second, much like Israel—and partially thanks to Israel—the Emiratis have excellent air defenses, which drastically lowers the chances of a mass-casualty event that would demand a severe military response. Worst of all for Abu Dhabi is the simple reality of proximity; because it is right next door, Tehran gets to use its cheaper, less valuable short-range rockets to prove its point.
As I noted during the war, the UAE has effectively become the new Gaza Envelope. At the time, the comparison was due to the heavy bombardments. Today, the metaphor is even more relevant: despite the occasional incoming missile, geopolitical realities dictate that it will just have to take it on the chin.
Construction site of thousands of new apartments in the northern town of Katsrin, Golan Heights. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)
If I were to ask you which role in the Israeli government is considered "no less and perhaps even more important" than the head of the Shin Bet—Israel’s internal security agency—what would you guess? The Chief of Staff of the IDF? The Director of the Mossad?
When Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli used that phrase, he was referring to the appointment of Yehuda Eliyahu as the new director general of the Israel Land Authority.
Why is this position “more important than the head of the Shin Bet?”
The Israel Land Authority is the body that manages the nation’s real estate, making it quietly one of the most powerful organizations in the country. This is because in Israel, unlike any other OECD country, 93 percent of all the land is publicly owned. For comparison, the only countries that come anywhere close to that percentage are massive nations with vast swathes of uninhabited wilderness, like Canada and Australia, and Israel still outdoes both.
This system is largely due to two historical factors. First, due to its socialist beginnings, Israel never had a “Manifest Destiny” policy where the government aggressively sold off public land to private citizens to encourage expansion. Second, the system is deeply rooted in early Zionist ideology—which dictates that the land is meant to be held in trust for the Jewish people in perpetuity, to be leased rather than sold outright.
Much like with a lot of early Israeli ideology, lovely in theory, an economic nightmare in practice. Virtually all real estate development in the country operates via top-down planning; rather than market forces determining housing supply and demand, these critical economic decisions are controlled entirely by state bureaucrats.
Head of the Israel Land Authority Yehuda Eliyahu.
This brings us back to the new director at hand. Yehuda Eliyahu was selected by a professional committee of security and housing officials, moving from his previous position as the head of the Settlement Administration—a post he held for the past three years.
Whether you agree with the settlement enterprise or not, that is an impressive resume. During his tenure, planning for over 100 settlements and outposts was advanced, far outpacing any previous administration. The selection committee specifically recognized his “special expertise in the field of enforcement and preservation of state land.”
His appointment is about two Arab-majority regions in Israel. For once, we aren’t talking about Judea and Samaria, but rather the Negev desert in Israel’s south and the Galilee in the north.
As Minister Chikli explained in a recent podcast interview, the government is primarily concerned with the demographic math in these areas:
“The current picture is that in the central Galilee area, there are about half a million Arab Israeli citizens and a hundred thousand Jews. Part of this is a Bedouin population, some of whom serve [in the military], but there is also a less integrated population... Within this space live about a hundred thousand Jews, meaning Jews make up a total of 16 percent. That is not a good figure.”
This ratio isn’t just the product of natural growth; it’s the result of discriminatory housing policies.
The state actively funds and manages master plans for Arab towns, absorbing the costs for residents. Conversely, Jewish rural communities are forced to self-fund their own planning and infrastructure, creating a massive financial bottleneck.
The government has also been unequally incentivizing settlement in these regions. Residents of Arab towns in the north often receive 12 percent tax rebates with remarkably high income ceilings. Meanwhile, just down the road, neighboring Jewish urban hubs are capped at a 7 percent rebate with only half the income ceiling.
However, the most potent tool for demographic engineering has been land appraisals. In the Galilee Jewish community of Shekhanya, the ILA appraised a lot at 1.5 million NIS. One kilometer away in the Arab town of Kaukab, a larger lot was appraised at merely 50,000 NIS—charging Jews a 3,000 percent markup.
Adding insult to injury is the matter of IDF reservists. The government introduced a targeted policy to give active reservists an additional 100,000 NIS discount on land parcels. Combine that with the 900,000 NIS base regional discount, and building a home suddenly becomes highly affordable for young families. That is, of course, unless the ILA bureaucratically sabotages the math by appraising the dirt at an absurd markup.
How did we get here?
For that, we have one of Israel’s strangest, yet most enduring political marriages to thank: the alliance between the Haredim and the Arabs.
MK Yitzchak Goldknopf attends a meeting of the Committee on Public Projects at the Knesset. (Yonatan Sindel/Flash90)
Housing Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf, head of the United Torah Judaism party, ultimately oversees the ILA. As part of his administration, he actively advanced a resolution to maintain steep land discounts—effectively dropping land costs to near-zero—for Arabs in the north. This specific policy is actually a continuation of an agreement originally established with Mansour Abbas’s Arab Ra’am party during the previous government.
Why would a Haredi minister do this? Because Goldknopf is far more interested in securing centrally located land for Haredi urban expansion than he is in subsidizing land for reservists in the periphery. He is more than happy to trade pro-Arab housing policies in the north for other political favors Jerusalem.
But zooming out from the political weeds, there is a fair question to be asked: Should the ILA explicitly try to benefit Jewish housing at the expense of Arab citizens? It cuts to the core of one of Israel’s most fundamental dilemmas—is it a Jewish state, or a state for all its citizens?
Adding a layer of complication to this is the Jewish National Fund. Roughly 13 percent of the national land—including some of the most valuable real estate in the country—belongs directly to the JNF, purchased using donations from Jews worldwide to benefit the Jewish people.
The inherent tension between the national rights of the Jewish people and the civil rights of all Israeli citizens is profoundly difficult to balance, and it will be incumbent upon Eliyahu to manage this delicate dynamic. However, two realities remain undeniable: given the sacrifices of the past three years, active reservists deserve access to affordable housing, and implementing policies that radically benefit one group at the deliberate expense of another is simply unjust.
English Editor: Ari Tatarka
If you enjoy the newsletter, you can show your support by becoming a paid subscriber—it really helps keep this going. I’m also offering a special monthly briefing for a small group of premium members. I’d love to have you join us—just click below to find out more.
Thanks for reading It’s Noon in Israel! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.
I don’t understand, why isn’t the land priced the same for both Jews and Arabs? It doesn’t make sense that Israel would discriminate against Jews in Galilee.
Sounds like a land system bound to collapse under its own weight. Much like any socialist based system.