Who is Gadi Eisenkot?

As he outpolls Bennett, the Yashar! chairman’s shot at the premiership looks increasingly likely, and more.

Staff Sgt. Adam Tzarfati, 20, killed in south Lebanon on June 1, 2026 (Courtesy)

It’s Monday, June 1, and before getting to today’s analysis, a quick news update.

Staff Sgt. Adam Tzarfati, 20, was killed in action in southern Lebanon last night, marking the 14th IDF casualty since the Lebanon ceasefire took effect. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the resumption of airstrikes on Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut’s Dahiya district—an area left virtually untouched since the April ceasefire, save for a single pinpoint strike in May. The IDF is seemingly signaling that the slow, attritional drone warfare approach should not continue, and that a return to overwhelming force would be preferable.

This rapid escalation comes as U.S. President Donald Trump’s “largely negotiated” regional deal appears to have collapsed, with immense pressure mounting on both sides. As of this writing, Hezbollah’s next move remains unclear.

Now, onto today’s articles.

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Gadi Eisenkot attends a conference at the Academic College in Tel Aviv, January 6, 2026. (Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90)

When forming the “Together” alliance with Opposition Leader Yair Lapid, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett attempted the electoral equivalent of predatory pricing: absorbing a temporary hit to his right-wing flank to clear out opposition rivals. However, the strategy failed to corner the market. Instead, it cheapened his brand, driving voters toward a more bespoke “higher-quality” product: Gadi Eisenkot.

A Friday Ma’ariv poll shows “Together” retreating to 22 seats, a six-seat drop from its peak. Conversely, Eisenkot’s Yashar! party gained two mandates this week to reach 17 seats—bringing his total gains to five mandates since Bennett and Lapid first announced their merger. According to a Channel 12 poll on the same day, 45 percent of respondents prefer Eisenkot for the premiership, compared to 36 percent for Bennett.

This raises an obvious question: Who is Eisenkot, and why is he so popular?

For the Eisenkot voter, the first—and most crucial—thing that comes to mind is his tenure as IDF chief of staff from 2015 to 2019. This places him among other IDF chiefs who have entered politics, which is to say most of them.

Of the 24 individuals to lead Israel’s army, 14 have transitioned into national politics. Two went on to become prime minister (Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak), four served as minister of defense, and another six served as cabinet ministers or members of Knesset. That list includes the previous forerunner to replace Netanyahu: former Defense Minister and Blue and White Chairman Benny Gantz.

It isn’t that Israelis are so nostalgic for their mandatory military service that they want to extend it into civilian life. Rather, a chief of staff pedigree scratches the Israeli electorate’s undisputed No. 1 voting itch: security. Not to mention, the IDF remains the most trusted institution in the country, far outpacing the Knesset and the High Court. Naturally, some of that residual trust rubs off on its leaders.

Where exactly does this former chief of staff fall on the political spectrum?

Officially, he has avoided sharp partisan identification and played squarely to his strengths, adopting a common-interest approach bolstered by his lack of a polarizing political history and the tragic loss of his son Gal in Gaza in the first two months of the war.

In reality, his ideological gravity pulls toward the center-left. While Eisenkot has consistently opposed settlement expansion in Judea and Samaria, his post-October 7 declaration that a Palestinian state is currently “irrelevant” was a nod to the national consensus. Yet, the fact that he only explicitly deemed a Palestinian state a taboo after October 7 leaves right-wing voters deeply skeptical. Recognizing this hesitation, Eisenkot’s strategy relies entirely on his core brand assets: integrity and security.

In life, a man is known by the company he keeps; in Israeli politics, a politician is known by the list he fields. So far, Yashar! has assembled a curated security and integrity roster: four generals, four high-level bureaucrats, and a select group of civil society figures, including a prominent hostage activist and a Haredi enlistment advocate. To anchor his right flank, Eisenkot secured former Shin Bet Director Yoram Cohen and former Minister of Religious Affairs Matan Kahana.

This ideological balancing act will not be enough to sweep the hard right, but it provides more than enough cover for center-left, centrist, and soft center-right voters to comfortably take a chance on him, sapping the strength of alternative centrist options—primarily Bennett’s Together.

Then there is Eisenkot’s unconventional weapon: his complete absence of flash. In stark contrast to the polished, media-trained delivery of Bennett, Lapid, and Netanyahu, Eisenkot’s public speaking is unrefined, and his English is virtually nonexistent. But national exhaustion changes what voters want. Sometimes, an electorate simply craves the quiet safety of a caretaker—an Anthony Eden after Winston Churchill, or a Joe Biden after Trump. Eisenkot is banking on the hope that his lack of luster is a feature, not a bug.

But all of this is ultimately just card shuffling—opposition voters migrating from one deck to another without actually growing the bloc. If they are chasing that magic number of 61, there are only three potential reservoirs to draw from: the right, the Arab parties, or the ultra-Orthodox. If two of those routes remain politically taboo for the base, the opposition is left with a single path to power: peeling away right-wing voters. And it won’t be Eisenkot who convinces them to cross the aisle.

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A missile fired from Lebanon toward Israel caused damage in the northern Israeli city of Kiryat Shmona, May 30, 2026. (Ayal Margolin/Flash90)

Like magic, the moment it became virtually certain that the elections would be moved up, the unfathomable gaps between the polling institutes began to narrow slightly. In the polls that were harshest on the Netanyahu bloc, he climbed to 53 to 56 seats; in the polls that favored him, he dropped to 60. The common denominator across almost all polls: neither bloc has a majority.

Another conclusion that is becoming sharper is that the story of these elections isn’t about shifts between blocs, but rather motivation gaps between the camps. There is no dispute that the voter turnout in the center-left will be roughly 110 percent. The ultimate question of the upcoming elections is whether coalition supporters will stampede to the ballot boxes, trudge there reluctantly, or stay home. The polls predicting a collapse for Netanyahu are factoring in fatigue and apathy among right-wing voters, while those forecasting his victory predict an awakening and engagement. In short, it’s less about statistics and more about psychology.

What is the main factor determining whether right-wing voters will turn out? With all due respect, it has little to do with who will head the opposing camp or what the Likud list will look like, but rather with security. Conventional wisdom suggests the story is Iran, but assuming the regime doesn’t fall and there isn’t another round before the elections, the real event is actually Lebanon. Until three months ago, this was the arena of absolute, indisputable victory—from the pagers, through the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, to the active ceasefire where Israel struck repeatedly without facing retaliation. Since the beginning of March, however, the north has been bombarded and soldiers are being hunted by drones.

As they say in the Mossad, after an operation there are two options: win or explain. In Lebanon, the explanations are long; some are naturally justified and tied to the relationship with the U.S. and Hezbollah’s distress, but the bottom line is that victory is still far off. The dire situation of the northern residents, many of whom are coalition supporters, corrodes like acid the sense of achievement against the Axis of Evil and undermines what was once Netanyahu’s calling card when approaching the voter. On the flip side, Hezbollah is left with one remaining threat—fiber-optic drones.

Therefore, the God’s-eye view of these elections is the question of how to handle those very drones. Neutralizing this Hezbollah weapon will halt the parade of “cleared for publication” announcements and strip Iran’s last proxy of its final tool. Quiet—and not an illusory one—in Lebanon is a necessary condition for the residents of Israel, and consequently, for Netanyahu’s chances of survival.

Perhaps this is why Likud continued to fight this week to delay the elections as much as possible, despite the agreement with Iran looming on the horizon. The Ukrainians and Russians have been trying for four years to find a solution to the drone issue, without notable success. Israel will find it faster, but not necessarily fast enough.

This is an excerpt from my weekly column in Israel Hayom

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How does the Israeli system actually work? What are the branches of Israel’s government? And after the votes are cast, how does a ruling coalition take form?

Yesterday, I joined Dan Senor and Nadav Eyal on the Call Me Back podcast to establish the ground rules of Israel’s political architecture as part of their Israel Votes series.

To listen click here.

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English Editor: Ari Tatarka

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