It’s Noon in Israel: Will Israel Be Iran's Revenge?

Also, phase two of Trump's peace plan begins, and a new report reveals another threat to Israel's future.

President Donald Trump speaks with members of the media before boarding Marine One last Friday (whitehouse.gov)

It’s Wednesday, January 14, and we’ve got an old-fashioned Mexican standoff. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have their guns trained on the ayatollah; Ali Khamenei’s got one in each hand—one aimed at Israel, the other at the U.S. What happens next depends entirely on where Trump’s aiming.

The speaker of Iran’s parliament made it clear on Sunday: if the regime is attacked, Israel and local U.S. bases will be targets. But they have no reason to shoot first. If they break the silence, they get filled with lead immediately.

That is, unless Trump is shooting to overthrow the regime. In that case, they may as well try to take as much of the “Great Satan” and the “Little Satan” down with them. The current assumption within the IDF is that if Trump goes in for the kill, Israel will be the first to take the hit.

But something still holds Iran back. Israel has a card it’s been keeping in reserve—the ability to cripple two-thirds of Iran’s economy in a single strike. All it would take is a handful of precision bombs on critical oil infrastructure, and the bottom would fall out of their already struggling economy overnight.

Israel held back that card during the June war as a deterrent: even if the Iranians believed they had more missiles than Israel had interceptors, they knew Israel could make them bleed harder if they went all out.

But whether that option still matters is another question. The loss of oil revenue would hurt—badly—but a big part of the deterrent was the civil unrest that would follow an economic collapse. Right now, civil unrest in Iran can’t get much worse.

Besides, Israel has no interest in starving the Iranian people—only in ensuring that the ones holding the guns think twice before pulling the trigger.

But the choice remains with the Americans. The IRGC, the oil, the missiles, Khamenei himself—all are options. What is clear is that they will first consult with Israel, make sure they have what they need.

That takes time, so it may take longer than people think for the first bullet to be fired.

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IDF activity along the Yellow Line area in eastern Rafah. (IDF)

Phase Two begins as around a dozen individuals have received invitations to join the Transitional Technocratic Committee tasked with managing Gaza. Hamas said this week that it’s willing to hand over control to the committee—but not in the way you might think.

The move raises plenty of questions, but first, a concern.

For Israelis, a critical part of the plan is missing: the remains of the final hostage in Gaza, Ran Gvili. Still, it seems the world will not wait for one man. Trump met with Ran’s parents at Mar-a-Lago last week but made it clear that his plan will move forward regardless of the remaining hostage.

Now, onto the questions.

What does Hamas mean when it says it will “hand over control”?

In practice, it is delegating the dull work of governance so Hamas can focus on its true passion—terrorism. The new committee would handle day-to-day management, while Hamas retains power on the ground, free to exploit and intimidate without the burdens of responsibility.

Hamas is likely hoping that the committee will provide a veneer of progress and moderation—just enough to unlock reconstruction funds, while the demand for disarmament quietly fades from the agenda.

So, what about disarmament?

It hasn’t faded. Trump has no interest in letting the new committee become a mask for Hamas’s recovery. According to my sources, Trump is likely to issue another deadline—something along the lines of: “Disarm in sixty days, or… (insert Trump threat here).”

That threat will come with Israel as the guarantor: the clock runs out, Hamas refuses to disarm, and Israel goes back in.

In their wake, the new committee would step in to govern the areas cleared by the IDF. In this theoretical timeline, the long-discussed International Stabilization Force finally materializes—to support the committee and take over basic policing once Israel has disarmed the threat. But all of this remains theoretical.

A few of the committee members have been announced, including an ex-PA deputy minister and an official from Hamas’s finance ministry, neither of whom raise immediate red flags.

But whether they will be able to lead Gaza into a brighter future depends more on the IDF’s ability than their own.

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Ultra-Orthodox enlisting in the IDF's new Haredi brigade January 5. (IDF)

Fairness matters. When it comes to the ultra-Orthodox question, most of the public focus is on their lack of army service. But according to a new report, there’s just as much imbalance in the economic sphere.

Dr. Gilad Cohen-Kovacs of the Israel Democracy Institute found that the ultra-Orthodox community costs the government roughly ₪32 billion [$8.8 billion] a year in direct subsidies and public services. That translates into an annual burden of about ₪13,000 [$3,600] per non-Haredi family.

The reason isn’t a mystery: large families, low labor participation, and heavy reliance on public welfare.

The national system relies on the most basic rule of sustainable systems—more has to go in than comes out.

A non-Orthodox Jewish household contributes a net ₪1,350 [$370] a month to the state.
An Arab household costs the state ₪5,034 [$1,380] a month.
An ultra-Orthodox household? ₪10,318 [$2,830] net loss every month.

A senior official at Israel’s national bank once told me he could summarize Israel’s long-term economic challenge in three words: “Haredim, Haredim, Haredim.”

The report seems to agree. It projects that by 2050, the transfer burden will rise by 75 percent, reaching ₪59–64 billion [$16.2–17.6 billion] per year in today’s terms. The cost per non-Orthodox household would climb to roughly ₪30,000 [$8,250] annually.

It’s simply unsustainable.

This issue isn’t a matter of religion—it’s just accounting.

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