Did the Lion Roar or Scream? Israeli Experts Disagree
Also, Israel's biggest pilgrimage canceled.
Head of Rafael Systems Yuval Steinitz and former head of Military Intelligence Tamir Hayman (Tomer Neuberg/Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)
It’s Monday, May 4, and Donald Trump has officially unveiled “Project Freedom”—a humanitarian operation launching today to safely escort neutral commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The ostensible goal is to rescue sailors stranded by the blockade. The actual goal is a reassertion of American naval dominance in the Persian Gulf.
Tehran, naturally, is unimpressed. Not passionate humanitarians to begin with, Iran has warned that any U.S. vessel entering the strait will be fired upon. After nearly a month of a suffocating blockade, we are finally watching an escalation unfold.
All of this brings us back to the lingering question that has haunted the Israeli defense establishment since the Iranian ceasefire: If the campaign stops here, was it a success?
Two highly informed Israeli experts—both of whom I deeply respect—have come to opposite conclusions. The first is Tamir Hayman, former head of IDF Military Intelligence, who spoke with my colleague Yonit Levi on Channel 12. The second is Yuval Steinitz, a veteran cabinet minister and current chairman of Rafael, whom I interviewed on Meet the Press. And so, in the great Jewish tradition, let us argue:
We can start with their overall assessments. Hayman, ever the measured intelligence chief, concluded that the overall balance of the campaign “leans toward the negative.” Steinitz diverged slightly, calling it “a massive victory” reminiscent of the Six-Day War.
This gap in perception hinges almost entirely on their assessment of Israel’s greatest existential threat: the nuclear program. Steinitz argues that by eliminating top scientists—an achievement he enthusiastically notes happened in the “first 7 seconds” of the campaign—and destroying weaponization equipment, Israel bought itself significant time. He claims that while Iran may have previously been months away from a bomb, “this time in my opinion it is several years,” because the physical mechanisms required to build a warhead were removed from the equation.
Iran’s underground missile facilities.
Hayman, however, refuses to grade on a curve. To the former intel chief, blowing up weaponization labs and eliminating scientists doesn’t matter if the raw materials are still sitting safely underground. He completely rejects Steinitz’s premise, warning that the fundamental components of a nuclear breakout—the subterranean facilities, the advanced centrifuges and the stockpiles of enriched uranium—were left intact inside the country. He bluntly states that “we hardly touched the nuclear issue,” warning that Iran’s breakout time remains dangerously short, leaving Israel in a situation “similar to the one in which we started the fighting.” While Hayman acknowledges his assessment might shift if a negotiated agreement ultimately collars the Iranian program, short of that, his conclusion is stark: “If the nuclear threat is not addressed, then the question arises—what did we do in this whole event?”
This profound divide extends to their views on the stability of the Iranian regime. Steinitz sees a government on its knees. He argues that the strikes so thoroughly decimated Iranian supply chains and infrastructure that the country has “turned from a tiger into a cat.” In his view, Iran is “highly weakened” and teetering “on the verge of collapse”—suggesting the ayatollahs would have fallen completely had the U.S. not prematurely halted the war.
Hayman views the exact same scenario and sees a disaster. To him, the regime’s sheer survival against a coordinated U.S.-Israeli coalition is a terrifying victory for Tehran. He argues that “in the eyes of the regime itself, it is stronger because it experienced the most severe thing—and survived it.” Worse, he warns that Israel will inevitably have to strike again in the future, and when that day comes in a post-Trump era, there is a very high chance Israel will be left to face an emboldened regime alone.
Their diverging assessments also depend heavily on how they view the threat of ballistic missiles. For Steinitz, the strikes represent one of the war’s seminal achievements: “Their production capacity in the factories stood at 3,000 to 4,000 missiles a year, and now there are no factories; they were totally destroyed. They didn’t hit the mixer—they flattened the factories.” By his math, destroying those production lines bought Israel half a decade of safety, calculating that “in another 4 years without this operation, there would have been, let’s say, 16,800 ballistic missiles aimed at Israel—and now there are only 800.”
Hayman completely subordinates the missile threat to the nuclear one. He readily concedes that Israel inflicted massive conventional damage, noting “an erosion of the military capabilities of the Revolutionary Guards, both in the Air Force and the Navy.” Yet he remains deeply pessimistic because, in his eyes, Israel failed to neutralize the “crown jewel” of the Iranian threat.
There is nothing more Israeli than looking at the exact same rubble and arriving at two completely different conclusions. Ultimately, it comes down to their professional DNA. Steinitz is the industrialist; if he were Iranian, he’d be tearing his hair out over the flattened factories and shattered supply chains. Hayman is the intelligence man; if he were Iranian, he’d be looking at the untouched nuclear program and quietly smiling.
We can end this argument with the Talmudic dictum, “These and these are the words of the living God”—which is an ancient Jewish way of saying they are both right. The nuclear program needs to be addressed, but crippling the ballistic missile pipeline is still a considerable victory. When it comes to regime stability, however, their opinions are much harder to reconcile; only the ayatollahs’ actual survival or collapse will vindicate either side.
Hayman’s nuclear fixation reflects the prevailing mood within both the security establishment and the broader Israeli public. Even if the nuclear threat has been delayed, as Steinitz insists, it remains the ultimate trophy the country has its eyes on. Whether Netanyahu can bring that prize home will likely be the critical question that makes or breaks him in this year’s elections.
Workers dismantle signs at the gravesite of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in Meron, northern Israel, after the Lag BaOmer celebrations were canceled and the area was declared a closed military zone. (David Cohen/Flash90)
Judaism has a long tradition of pilgrimage. During the Second Temple era, the three pilgrimage festivals brought hundreds of thousands of Jews to Jerusalem from as far away as Lebanon, Egypt and modern-day Iraq. Today, even without the Temple, Israelis still love a good pilgrimage.
In the month preceding the High Holidays, tens of thousands travel to Jerusalem to pray at the Western Wall late into the night. During the summer, tens of thousands will make the traditional journey to Cyprus and Thailand. But the largest annual pilgrimage in Israel is the festival of Lag BaOmer, the day commemorating the passing of second-century sage Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai.
Every year, hundreds of thousands of Israelis make the trek to his gravesite on the slopes of Mount Meron in the Galilee, lighting up the night with massive bonfires, music, and dancing. But the pilgrimage has been heavily restricted since 2021, when a tragic crowd crush caused by failing infrastructure killed 45 people. Not only was it the deadliest civilian disaster in Israeli history, but because most of the globe was still paralyzed by COVID lockdowns, it was also the largest religious gathering in the world at the time. Today, the memory of that disaster remains inextricably linked to the event in the national consciousness.
Following 2021, the gathering was scaled back. By 2024, it was canceled entirely due to regular rocket fire from Hezbollah in the north, before briefly returning in 2025. This year, despite an identical state of ceasefire on paper, the risk of Hezbollah drones is significantly higher. As a result, the government has once again canceled the mass celebrations, setting up roadblocks to intercept those who might still try to make the journey.
But security threats aren’t the only reason the state is so quick to shut the mountain down. In recent years, Israel’s springs have grown hotter and drier, turning the tradition of lighting thousands of giant bonfires into a different disaster waiting to happen. To stop celebrants from inadvertently torching half the country, the government has adopted a tradition of its own: finding creative bureaucratic excuses to ban the fires. This year, they issued deeply earnest warnings about air pollution and public health, politely suggesting that citizens celebrate the great sage with a hike instead.
Rabbi Nachman Biderman and his followers light a bonfire during Lag BaOmer celebrations, in Meron, 2025. (David Cohen/Flash90)
Adding to the confusion, even as Israel enters the summer months, unseasonal rain is washing over the north, and incredibly rare May snow is actually forecast for Mount Hermon. I am not usually one to divine God’s will from the weather, but it does feel like the heavens are gently pointing out that—whether out of sympathy for the forests or concern over Hezbollah drones—giant bonfires on an exposed northern mountain aren’t the best idea right now.
But this is Israel, and tradition rarely yields to common sense or government decree. Tonight, thousands of smaller fires will still be lit in empty lots and streets across the country. The dances will happen, and the songs will be sung. It leaves me with absolute certainty that the great fires of Meron will eventually burn again—no matter how much the government might wish they wouldn’t.
English Editor: Ari Tatarka
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Centrifuges are delicate machines that, internally, spin at supersonic speeds and require a highly stable electricity supply. IAEA Rafael Grossi stated after the 12 Day War that the destruction of the electric plant at Natanz was likely to have destroyed all the centrifuges underground there too.
The simple fact is that bombing campaigns rarely achieve their goals.and their proponents consistently overate their effects. Countries with powerful air forces favor them because they are easy to do, result in few losses and on the surface create a picture of vast destruction.
But you can’t eliminate knowledge through bombing. Usually the destruction is less than first assumed. And a country with an ally like China can readily replace equipment which isn’t salvageable.