Israel Is Running Out of Time in Gaza
Also, Eisenkot tries to bluff his way into office, and how Haredim negotiate.
Tents sheltering displaced Palestinians cover the grounds of Deir al-Balah Stadium in the central Gaza Strip, November 21, 2026. (Ali Hassan/Flash90)
It’s Sunday, November 22, and “a ceasefire that delivers nothing visible cannot be sustained indefinitely,” the Board of Peace told the UN Security Council on Tuesday. This week its senior adviser, Josh Gruenbaum, went further, reportedly warning Israel that the US-led body overseeing the Gaza ceasefire will hand the keys to the enclave to the UN unless there is progress.
It is worth remembering what the 20-point plan achieves: a government in the Strip that excludes Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority short of reforms it has proved incapable of achieving, from any governing role, and that makes Hamas’s disarmament a precondition, all under American rather than UN stewardship. Most impressively, it does something no previous agreement between Israel and the Palestinians managed. It separates Gaza from Judea and Samaria.
Far from perfect, granted. But name the last agreement this favorable to Israel that made it onto paper. Then consider the alternative: the UN, and a long detour to Rafah by way of Ramallah, with the recent memory of Israel sitting on its hands when handed the initiative hanging over any future deal.
More than a potential solution for Gaza, the agreement is a pressure valve. If that wasn’t clear from British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband’s latest sanctions, or from House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries calling the status quo “unacceptable,” it should be now: nobody is waiting for Israel’s next government to win a confidence vote. Both men speak of the two-state solution as their “north star.” It is in Israel’s best interest that the Board of Peace guide their future journeys.
Come January, Jeffries is expected to hold the speaker’s gavel, and he has already put his name to a bill that would write the Biden-era sanctions on violent settlers into law. From there it is a short journey to British-style import bans and construction sanctions, especially once a different administration sits in the White House.
In Gaza, Israel has the opportunity to move the story to a front that offers a chance of recovery, and away from the open wound of Judea and Samaria, where no solution satisfactory to the international community is in sight.
None of this means Israel should march out of Gaza and trust the Board of Peace to achieve its eponymous goal. But Hamas has signed onto a roadmap in which disarmament and withdrawal move sector by sector, and has declared its willingness to abide by it. Put that commitment to the test.
Of course, movement on this front requires a stable government in Israel, one with enough legitimacy for what will likely be an unpopular set of steps, especially with the country’s right. Israel needs one as soon as possible. The world will not wait.
MK Gadi Eisenkot attends a Knesset plenum session during the election of MK Matan Kahana of the Yashar party as Speaker of the 26th Knesset, replacing outgoing Speaker Amir Ohana, at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, November 17, 2026. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
Over the objections of his partners, Yisrael Beytenu’s Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett, Gadi Eisenkot is pushing to present a minority government this week, one that depends on the votes of the Arab parties. Eisenkot is trying to bluff his way into government—a pity his partners are all better poker players than he is.
Undermined by Lieberman donning a shtreimel and Bennett erecting his tent in the unity camp, Eisenkot is trying to throw up his hands, declare both plans dead and clear a path to government through the Arabs.
The problem is twofold.
If this is a bluff, it will fail. Eisenkot, a relative newcomer to the political casino, is challenging world-class players. In 2019 Benjamin Netanyahu tried to bluff Lieberman into line; the result was five elections in under four years. Bennett, meanwhile, played a seven-seat hand all the way to the Prime Minister’s Office. Neither will fold if Eisenkot raises the stakes.
Regardless of whether it is real or a bluff, it will fail, and Eisenkot will lose chips. If Bennett and Lieberman vote against, which they have every interest in doing, the “emergency government” musters about 48 votes to 72. Even if both merely abstain, it loses 48 to 53.
The correct answer to “Which government do you prefer, Arabs or Haredim?” is “neither, ideally.” Lieberman’s open embrace of one will cost him at the next election. Eisenkot’s quiet preference for the other costs him relatively little; charging through the resistance waving it like a flag will not come cheaply, all the more so if it fails to topple Netanyahu.
As part of what it called a “genuine and sincere effort” to establish the broadest possible government, Yashar invited Likud to a marathon of talks, starting today. The likely outcome is a marathon run on the spot. Eisenkot wants the premiership first; short of an uncharacteristic burst of generosity, Netanyahu will not hand it over while the minority option is still dead on arrival.
Unity is an option made in the final round, when every player has seen the river, everyone has exhausted their chips and no one holds a winning hand.
Shas party chairman Aryeh Deri leaves the home of Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, the party’s spiritual leader, following a meeting in Jerusalem, November 13, 2026. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
To understand the Haredi mind in the negotiations, you need to know two important principles, obvious to every Haredi but less familiar to the general public. Understanding them will help assess where things are headed, and whether the Haredim will break their longstanding alliance with the right. How longstanding? Since 1990, when the Lithuanian leader Rabbi Elazar Shach’s principle was set, whose political translation is: we will go with the left only if it already has a majority; we will not form a coalition for it on our own initiative.
The first rule is certainty versus doubt. One person claims: you borrowed 100 shekels from me. The other says: maybe, but I’m not convinced. In the Hasidic faction they believe one thing is certain, and that is that from Netanyahu they will get nothing. It doesn’t matter whether it is because of the legal system, or because he promises and doesn’t deliver. Four years were enough to instill certainty in them on this. With Lieberman and Eisenkot, by contrast, there is a chance: that the legal advisers will fall into line, that the High Court will go quiet, that the media will keep up its embarrassing silence on the issue when suddenly there is no draft-evasion law, no petitions in the Shabbat bulletins of the knitted-kippah community and no pointed columns about the plight of the reservists. Is that certain? No. But it is preferable. The alternative is a slide into yet another election during which the arrests continue, and then, at best, another Netanyahu government in which they can do nothing.
Shas leader Aryeh Deri, by contrast, holds to something else, Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance: “What is complete repentance? When the same thing that he once did comes before him, and it is in his power to do it again, and he does not.” A man eats a cheeseburger at McDonald’s because it tastes good. A year passes, he lands again at the same branch, they offer it again, and this time he declines.
Deri has flogged himself for years over joining Yitzhak Rabin’s peace government despite his rabbi’s explicit ruling. On the eve of his entry to prison, before tens of thousands in 2000, he tearfully asked the rabbi’s forgiveness. And here the same situation has come before him again: again Shas with six seats, again the other camp has a majority with the Arabs but Shas gives it the Jewish majority. Again they are offering to fold the flags of religion and state, just to break up the alliance with the right. The smell of the cheeseburger is in the air, but for now Deri stays outside, refusing every offer to come in and partake.
This is an excerpt from a weekly column in Israel Hayom.
English Editor: Ari Tatarka
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It seems we hear an awful lot in this mess of a so-called election about “what’s in it for them” with regard to each of these squabbling factions, and yet so little about what these myriad conglomerations mean for for the future of the state of Israel, the war in Gaza, the greater war against Iran and its proxies, and the very stability of the state government itself.
All these political machinations just sound like so much haggling over an inheritance that clearly none of them have a valid claim over, and worse, to the extent some are willing to sell off a part of that inheritance to a faction that only has an interest in seeing it destroyed altogether.
It is a disgraceful performance of pure political opportunism over the very future existence and security of the country itself.
It’s grotesque.